Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“Current export law controls both hardware and information concerning a wide range of designated “Defense Articles” in a way that may have a substantial impact on research at MIT. As a general proposition, a “deemed export” (one requiring a license and imposing access restrictions) exists whenever a foreign national on U.S. soil may be exposed to or be able to access in any manner an export controlled item of information.
From the current federal regulations may flow a cascade of effects adverse not only to research at MIT but to U.S. universities generally. Although there is a general exception for “fundamental research” under the export control regulations, certain universities have been informed either by manufacturers or by governmental agencies that scientific equipment provided to them or developed by them are subject to export controls.”
Response and Responsibility: Balancing Security and Openness in Research and Education* [ PDF* ] (152k)
Report of the President for the Academic Year 2001-02, which examines the balance that must be struck if the United States is to remain secure against terrorism while maintaining the openness necessary for research and education.
In the Public Interest* [ PDF* ] (210k)
Report of the Ad Hoc Faculty Committee on Access to and Disclosure of Scientific Information, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 2002. The committee was established ... to examine MIT’s policies dealing with restrictions on research, such as those arising from classified or industry-sponsored research. The committee’s work was done at a time of change in laws governing access to materials and information and disclosure of research results that followed the events of September 11, 2001. Restrictions on access to select biological agents, the application of export control provisions to university researchers, and a growing pressure to treat research results as sensitive create a new landscape for faculty, students, and MIT as an institution.
Stanford University
ITAR: Background reading*. Last updated June 6, 2001.
Faculty Essay: Security restrictions on research: a case of déjà vu*
by Donald Kennedy. Stanford On-line Report, Issue of May 31, 2000.
" It is strange how often history repeats itself and stranger still how often our memories fail to record its lessons....."
Satellite research grounded: Stanford, other universities oppose regulatory change*
by Dawn Levy. Stanford On-line Report, Issue of May 24, 2000.
"Just one sentence. That was all it took to ban a Stanford graduate student, who is Chinese, from continuing his work with basic spacecraft control algorithms. It was enough to prevent the world's expert in proton monitors, who is Irish, from being in the same room as the equipment he designed when American researchers bolted it onto a satellite. It prevented the signing of a contract that would allow Japanese, Stanford and Lockheed researchers to collaborate in studying the sun...."